Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Threat Modeling

Noticias externas — Tue, 16 Oct 2007 01:54:33 GMT

I've been reading a set of posts by Larry (who used to work just down the hall from me...) on threat

Threat Modeling

Eric Gunnerson's C# Compendium — Tue, 16 Oct 2007 01:46:55 GMT

I've been reading a set of posts by Larry (who used to work just down the hall from me...) on threat

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Larry Osterman [MSFT] — Wed, 03 Oct 2007 19:39:24 GMT

Gabe: Absolutely. There's absolutely nothing that a botnet client does that can't be done by a normal user. It sucks, but it's true.

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Gabe — Wed, 03 Oct 2007 19:35:49 GMT

LUA is great, but it doesn't solve the malware problem. Once everybody is running as LUA, the malware writers will just make malware that runs correctly as LUA also.

Threat Modeling

Wampiryczny blog — Tue, 02 Oct 2007 22:43:57 GMT

Larry Osterman na swoim blogu zamieścił serię artykułów na ten temat. Ciężkie, ale warte poznania. Nawet mimo tego, że David LeBlanc na temat przydatności threat modellingu ma nieco inne zdanie, choć wcale nie jednoznacznie negatywne. Temat i

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Larry Osterman [MSFT] — Tue, 02 Oct 2007 18:14:02 GMT

eam: You're absolutely right. And we've known that most malware written today is stopped completely by LUA. UAC is the first step towards forcing users to run with LUA.

The good news is that applications are starting to get a clue and the forcing function appears to be working.

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Eam — Tue, 02 Oct 2007 17:58:02 GMT

Larry:

I'm not debating the usefulness of threat modeling, and I think you've done a great job explaining it here.

My point is that, while it's nice Microsoft is trying to "enable the transition" to normal accounts, there's no real security until they actually *make* the transition.

Here Jeff Atwood finds that a number of drive-by downloads just don't work as a limited user, even on a vulnerable browser:

http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000891.html

There's not even a "Malware detected, cancel or allow?" prompt, which most regular people would not read and dismiss with a quick "allow."

Even if Microsoft modeled all sorts of threats and made perfect software, people are still going to run poor-quality third party applications. If those apps are running with admin privileges, the user is in trouble.

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Eam — Tue, 02 Oct 2007 17:36:40 GMT

John: You're absolutely correct. My mistake.

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

John C. Kirk — Tue, 02 Oct 2007 14:27:48 GMT

Eam, Larry: I think you may both be confusing LUA (Limited User Account) with UAC (User Account Control). If you don't want people to run as admin (which I agree with), then LUA is the alternative, i.e. they should have limited accounts!

re: Some final thoughts on Threat Modeling...

Tue, 02 Oct 2007 13:29:52 GMT

By the way, did you realize you have been slashdotted?