• Ntdebugging Blog

    Next Week: Windows NT Debugging Blog Live Chat


    Windows NT Debugging Blog Live Chat

    Microsoft Platform Global Escalation Services is hosting our second live group debug chat session for the debugging community on March 17, 2009 at 11 AM Pacific Time.  We will be focusing on debugging techniques and any questions you may have about anything we’ve previously blogged about. 

    Details about the “PGES-Windows NT Debugging Blog Live Chat” can be found here: http://www.microsoft.com/communities/chats/default.mspx

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  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Case Study - Software Restriction Policies and Large EXE Files


    Recently I received a debugging request for a customer having problems running large executables. On their systems, they could run most EXEs without any problems, but they had two programs that were over 1.8 GB which, when run, would display the following error:


    If they tried to run them in a command prompt, they received the message “Access is denied.” Both attempts were made with an administrator account and in neither case were the processes created. Through testing, they found that the programs worked if they were scheduled to run as System and also worked when run in safe mode as an administrator.

    When the case was brought to my attention, it was noted that when the failing executables were run, the following appeared in process monitor logs:


    The engineer did not see this when one of the problematic EXEs was run (successfully) on his test machine. The customer provided a VM image of their system which we set up in HyperV with a named pipe kernel debugger. I then started kernel debugging to find the cause of the INVALID PARAMETER error, hoping that resolving it would fix the issue.

    To start, I looked at the call stack within process monitor for the invalid parameter:


    The problem is this isn’t exactly where we return invalid parameter. Looking at the source code for Fltmgr, it doesn’t return invalid parameter – this was just where the error was caught in procmon. This call stack did provide some ideas for good starting places to debug, however. First, I looked up the hex value for STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER in ntstatus.h – 0xC000000D. Knowing this, I decided to set a breakpoint on nt!IofCallDriver and ran the program. Once the debugger broke in, I planned to use wt -oR. This will trace through the calls displaying the return values next to each call. From there, I would just need to find 0xC000000D on the return column. Unfortunately, what I had forgotten was wt does not display return codes in kernel debugging, only when debugging user mode.

    With wt not an option, I decided to use a combination of debugger commands to approximate the output of wt. I knew the return value I was looking for, and I was also confident that I would find that code in the EAX register after the problem occurred. As such, I needed to write a loop that would walk through the instructions until it found 0xC000000D in EAX. The debugger provides two main options for walking instructions: p and t. p (Step) will execute a single instruction and display the register values. If the instruction is a call, it will not enter that function, but just display the results after that subroutine has been executed. t (Trace) also executes a single instruction, but it will enter into the function and will display each instruction.

    In this case I wanted trace so I could see which function was returning the invalid parameter status. Tracing though that many instructions/functions would take a long time, but there are some variations on t (and p) that can help. tc (or pc)will execute instructions until a call statement is reached, where it will break and show the register values. tt (or pt) will execute instructions until a return instruction is reached. tct (or pct) will run until either a call or return is reached. In this case, I opted for tct.

    Knowing that I would use tct, I had to find a way to execute tct statements until EAX was the value I was looking for. This can be accomplished with the z (While) debugger command. The syntax is pretty easy, it’s just z(expression) and it works just like a do-while loop. Putting it all together, I used this command in the debugger:

    tct; z(eax!=0xc000000d)

    I then waited for the debugger to break in so I could see where this status was being thrown. Regrettably, the code called ended up going in to some recursion which made my while loop take way too long. To resolve this, I set a new breakpoint just before we entered the recursion, reran the program, used p to step past the call then ran the tct loop.

    This time I was quickly brought to the code I was looking for. As soon as it broke in, I ran k to view the callstack:

    kd> k

    ChildEBP RetAddr
    b9541a3c f7b7fab9 Ntfs!NtfsCommonDeviceControl+0x40
    b9541aa0 f7b8b02f Ntfs!NtfsFsdDispatchSwitch+0xe4
    b9541bbc 8081df85 Ntfs!NtfsFsdDispatchWait+0x1c
    b9541bd0 f7876d28 nt!IofCallDriver+0x45
    b9541bfc 8081df85 fltmgr!FltpDispatch+0x152
    b9541c10 f7876d28 nt!IofCallDriver+0x45
    b9541c3c 8081df85 fltmgr!FltpDispatch+0x152
    b9541c50 808f5437 nt!IofCallDriver+0x45
    b9541c64 808f61bf nt!IopSynchronousServiceTail+0x10b
    b9541d00 808eed08 nt!IopXxxControlFile+0x5e5
    b9541d34 808897bc nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0x2a
    b9541d34 7c82860c nt!KiFastCallEntry+0xfc
    0012e960 7c826fe9 ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet
    0012e964 77e416f9 ntdll!NtDeviceIoControlFile+0xc
    0012e9c8 77e6738d kernel32!DeviceIoControl+0x137
    0012ec44 77e67032 kernel32!GetVolumeNameForRoot+0x16d
    0012ec68 77e67782 kernel32!BasepGetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPoint+0x73
    0012ecd0 7d20b01d kernel32!GetVolumePathNameW+0x1c7
    0012ef18 7d20ae2c ADVAPI32!CodeAuthzFullyQualifyFilename+0xbc
    0012eff8 7d20b33f ADVAPI32!__CodeAuthzpIdentifyOneCodeAuthzLevel+0x19f
    0012f07c 77e6df9e ADVAPI32!SaferIdentifyLevel+0x163
    0012f278 77e6ce03 kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions+0x60c
    0012fa90 77e424b0 kernel32!CreateProcessInternalW+0xc0e
    0012fac8 4ad0256f kernel32!CreateProcessW+0x2c
    0012fc24 4ad01a2b cmd!ExecPgm+0x221
    0012fc58 4ad019b3 cmd!ECWork+0x84
    0012fc70 4ad03c58 cmd!ExtCom+0x40
    0012fe9c 4ad01447 cmd!FindFixAndRun+0xa9
    0012fee0 4ad0c30b cmd!Dispatch+0x137
    0012ff44 4ad07786 cmd!main+0x216
    0012ffc0 77e6f23b cmd!mainCRTStartup+0x12f
    0012fff0 00000000 kernel32!BaseProcessStart+0x23

    If we look at the assembly around Ntfs!NtfsCommonDeviceControl+0x40, we see that only if our return from NtfsDecodeFileObject is not equal to 4 it would move 0xC000000D in to esi, and then move esi to eax, :

    f7b7faf9 e8e904fdff call Ntfs!NtfsDecodeFileObject (f7b4ffe7)
    f7b7fafe 83f804 cmp eax,4
    f7b7fb01 0f848873ffff je Ntfs!NtfsCommonDeviceControl+0x54 (f7b76e8f)

    f7b7fafe 83f804 cmp eax,4
    f7b7fb01 0f848873ffff je Ntfs!NtfsCommonDeviceControl+0x54 (f7b76e8f)
    f7b7fb07 be0d0000c0 mov esi,0C000000Dh
    f7b7fb0c 56 push esi
    f7b7fb0d 53 push ebx
    f7b7fb0e 57 push edi
    f7b7fb0f e83506fdff call Ntfs!NtfsCompleteRequest (f7b50149)
    f7b7fb14 8bc6 mov eax,esi

    I looked at the source code for these functions, and it didn’t make sense that a failure here would cause the problems we were seeing; especially specific to large executables. Out of curiosity I ran notepad on the VM again with procmon and found that it too displayed INVALID PARAMETER, but the program started and ran correctly:


    Since this wasn’t the problem, I stopped reviewing the code and decided on a new approach. We knew that when running the EXE in a command prompt we received an “Access is denied message”. At that point it made sense to switch to user mode debugging and take a look at the cmd.exe process that was trying to launch install.exe

    Doing user mode debugging in a VM can be a bit of a challenge, especially if you are trying to minimize changes to the VM (and in my case, avoid putting any symbols on the customer’s VM image). Since I already had a kernel debugger attached, one option would be to run ntsd.exe (debugger provided in the Debugging Tools for Windows) on the VM with the -p switch specifying the PID of the cmd.exe process I wanted to debug and -d switch which forwards the i/o of ntsd to the kernel debugger. The problem with this approach is the kernel debugger just becomes a front end for issuing commands and seeing the output from ntsd. That means all symbol resolution is still done on the target system running ntsd.

    I didn’t want to give the customer VM Internet or corporate network access, so I instead opted to run dbgsrv.exe on the VM. Running “dbgsrv -t tcp:port=9999” tells the debug server to listen on TCP port 9999 for debugger connections. Then, on the HyperV server computer I could just run windbg -premote tcp:server=(IP of VM),port=9999 -p (PID of cmd on VM) to debug it.

    I suspected that we may be calling CreateProcess but it was failing, so I set a breakpoint on kernel32!CreateProcessW. Sure enough, it hit when I tried to run install.exe in the command prompt:

    0:000> k
    ChildEBP RetAddr
    0012fac8 4ad0256f kernel32!CreateProcessW
    0012fc24 4ad01a2b cmd!ExecPgm+0x221
    0012fc58 4ad019b3 cmd!ECWork+0x84
    0012fc70 4ad03c58 cmd!ExtCom+0x40
    0012fe9c 4ad01447 cmd!FindFixAndRun+0xa9
    0012fee0 4ad0c30b cmd!Dispatch+0x137
    0012ff44 4ad07786 cmd!main+0x216
    0012ffc0 77e6f23b cmd!mainCRTStartup+0x12f
    0012fff0 00000000 kernel32!BaseProcessStart+0x23

    This time I could use wt -oR since this was a usermode debug. Looking in ntstatus.h again, the code for STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED is 0xC0000022. Running wt can take a very long time, so I used the -l switch, which limits the number of levels deep it will display. This would be something like using tct as I did above until you were a few calls deep then using pct. Using wt -l 3 -oR gave me the following:

    575      291       [ 1] kernel32!CreateProcessInternalW
    35        0           [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    25        0           [ 3] ntdll!RtlEnterCriticalSection eax = 0
    48        25         [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    1          0           [ 3] ntdll!NtOpenThreadToken
    3          0           [ 3] ntdll!ZwOpenThreadToken eax = ffffffff`c000007c
    57        29         [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    1          0           [ 3] ntdll!ZwOpenProcessToken
    3          0           [ 3] ntdll!NtOpenProcessToken eax = 0
    116      33         [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    113      0           [ 3] ADVAPI32!SaferIdentifyLevel eax = 0
    130      146       [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    4           0          [ 3] ntdll!ZwClose eax = 0
    132      150       [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    22        0           [ 3] ntdll!RtlLeaveCriticalSection eax = 0
    138      172       [ 2] kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions
    5           0          [ 3] kernel32!__security_check_cookie eax = ffffffff`c0000022

     Now we are getting close! I set a new breakpoint for kernel32!BasepCheckWinSaferRestrictions and reran the test. This gave me the following line:

    63 0 [ 3] ADVAPI32!__CodeAuthzpCheckIdentityHashRules eax = ffffffff`c0000022

    One last run with a new breakpoint at ADVAPI32!__CodeAuthzpCheckIdentityHashRules and I found what I was looking for:

    58 218 [ 1] ADVAPI32!__CodeAuthzpEnsureMapped eax = ffffffff`c0000022

    The depth is shown in brackets. As this call was 1 deep from __CodeAuthzpCheckIdentityHashRules and I was using 3 as my maximum depth in wt, I knew this is where the STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED was coming from. I reviewed the source code and found that this is the code that performs Software Restriction Policy checking. Specifically, we are attempting to map the executable into memory to perform hash checking on it. Since there isn’t 1.8 GB of contiguous available memory, it failed. Looking at the VM, I discovered that the customer had implemented a number of software restriction policies. As a test, I removed their restrictions on the VM, and the programs ran successfully. A search of the KB revealed that a hotfix was published for this problem: 973825. Installing the hotfix in the article also resolved the issue with their policies intact.

    -Matt Burrough

  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Understanding !PTE, Part2: Flags and Large Pages


    Hello, it's Ryan Mangipano with part two of my PTE series. Today I'll discuss PDE/PTE flags, the TLB, and show you a manual conversion of x86 PAE Large Page Virtual Addresses to Physical. If you haven’t read the first part of this series please find it here. It's a good primer before proceeding.

    PDE and PTE flags 

    I'll start with a discussion about the PDE/PTE flags. If you recall from part one not all of the bits of the Page Directory Entry (PDE) are related to the index (used to form the pointer to the base of the next level).  This is true of the table entries in all the levels. For example, on a PAE x86 systems only 9 bits of the PTE (page table entry) are used for the index. During our previous conversion,  we only used some of the bits for the index into the next table. The rest of the data, we simply dropped off and replaced with zeros as needed. So what are the other bits used for? They are used for a series of flags. You will observe the state of these flags output by !PTE in the following manner: (-G-DA—KWEV).

    These flags are documented in the Intel Manuals. Intel and AMD reserved some of the flags for use by the Operating System. All of these are also documented in chapter 9 (Memory Management) of “Windows Internals, 5th edition”. Let’s dump the PDE from the virtual address we dissected last time. This will allow you to see some of the flags that are present in the other bits

    Obtaining the Virtual Address of the PDE

    1: kd> !pte 0xf9a10054

    VA f9a10054

    PDE at 00000000C0603E68    PTE at 00000000C07CD080

    contains 000000000102D963  contains 0000000002010121

    pfn 102d       -G-DA--KWEV    pfn 2010       -G--A—KREV


    Here is the data-type of our PDE

    1: kd> dt nt!_MMPTE u.Hard

       +0x000 u      :

          +0x000 Hard   : _MMPTE_HARDWARE


    Dumping the PDE and flags

    1: kd> dt _MMPTE_HARDWARE 00000000C0603E68


       +0x000 Valid            : 0y1

       +0x000 Writable         : 0y1

       +0x000 Owner            : 0y0

       +0x000 WriteThrough     : 0y0

       +0x000 CacheDisable     : 0y0

       +0x000 Accessed         : 0y1

       +0x000 Dirty            : 0y1

       +0x000 LargePage        : 0y0

       +0x000 Global           : 0y1

       +0x000 CopyOnWrite      : 0y0

       +0x000 Prototype        : 0y0

       +0x000 Write            : 0y1

       +0x000 PageFrameNumber  : 0y00000000000001000000101101 (0x102d)

       +0x000 reserved1        : 0y00000000000000000000000000 (0)


    Take note of the Letters in the PDE and PTE section of the !pte output, such as -G-DA--KWEV    . These letters represent various flags. The presence or absence of the letter in the !PTE output tells you the state of the flag. These flags can also be seen in the hardware pte output above. 

    Valid                   (V)         - Indicates that the data is located in physical memory. If this flag is not set, then the software can use ALL of the rest of the bits for whatever it wants(like storing the pagefile number and offset where the page is stored.
    Write                 (W/R)     - Indicates if the data is writeable or read-only. Multiprocessor or Vista or later. Hardware bit is documented in the processor manuals. Reserved Bit 11’s use is documented in Windows Internals, Chap. 9.
    Owner               (K/U)      - Indicates if the page is owned kernel mode or usermode. Kernel if cleared. User if set.
    WriteThrough  (T)           - When set indicates Writethrough caching policy. When not set indicates write-back caching policy
    CacheDisable   (N)           - If set, the page translation table or physical page it points to cannot be cached.   
    Accessed           (A)           - Set when the page itself, or the table referencing it has been read from or written to
    Dirty                   (D)          - Indicates if any data on this page has been updated
    LargePage         (L)            - This field is only used on PDEs, not PTEs. It indicates whether or not the PDE is the last table level (meaning that this entry references an actual page in memory) or if it is instead referencing a Page Table. If this bit is set in the PDE, this PDE points directly to a 2-MB page when PAE is in use. If PAE is not being used, the large page size that we are referencing is 4-MB. So basically, this is the page size bit. If this bit is cleared, the final destination page is 4k and can be found in the page table that this PDE points to. If this bit is set, then the final destination page is equal to the size of a large page on your system (2MB when PAE is in use) and can be located using the index value of this particular PDE since it becomes the last level. Keep in mind that a larger offset will be needed to reference all the positions in this large page since it is larger. To use this feature, the PSE bit (bit 4 which is the 5th bit over) must be set in CR4. The setting in CR4 is a global setting, enable the use of large pages on the system. The flag in the PDE only applies to the individual PDE.
    Global                 (G)        - If not set Translation Caching flushes affect this bit. If set, other processes use this translation also, so don’t flush it from the Translation Lookaside Buffer cache upon process context switches.
    CopyOnWrite    (C)       - Intel states this is a software field. Windows uses this for processes to share the same copy of a page. The system will give the process a private copy of this page if there is any attempt to write to the page by the process (by copying it). Any attempt to execute code in this page occurs on a No execute system will cause an access violation.
    Prototype           (P)        - Intel states this is a software field. Windows uses this to indicate that this is a prototype PTE.
    Reserved0                       - These Bits are Reserved
    E                            (E)       - Executable page. E is always displayed on platformst that Do not support hardware No-Execute.

    Inspecting the state of the flags is important when attempting to manually convert addresses from Virtual Addresses to Physical. For example, since the valid bit is not set in the following invalid PTE, all of the fields are available for Windows to use. This means the information in the processor manuals doesn’t apply. Instead it is an nt!_MMPTE_SOFTWARE which references data located in the page file.

    3: kd> !pte b8ae900c

                   VA b8ae900c

    PDE at 00000000C0602E28    PTE at 00000000C05C5748

    contains 000000000B880863  contains 000B8AF500000000

    pfn b880       ---DA--KWEV    not valid

                           PageFile:  0

                           Offset: b8af5

                           Protect: 0


    For more information on the different types of invalid PTEs, refer to page 775 of “Windows Internals, 5th edition”.

    Manually Converting x86 PAE Large Page Virtual Address to Physical

    In part one of this blog, we manually translated a PAE  4-KByte Page Virtual Address (VA). Now we are going to manually translate a VA that represents a Large Page from our PAE system. As discussed in the previous section on PTE flags, a large page allocation means that the page size is larger and the PDE points directly to the page itself. The PDE will not point to the base of a page table.  This means that there will be one less level of tables used in the translation.  This also means that more bits will be needed to represent the offsets in the large page.  I found the following address on my system that references a Large Page, 8054099e. Once again, all the required information was obtained from the processor manuals, debugger help file, and Windows Internals Book.

    1: kd> !pte 8054099e

                   VA 8054099e

    PDE at 00000000C0602010    PTE at 00000000C0402A00

    contains 00000000004009E3  contains 0000000000000000

    pfn 400        -GLDA--KWEV    LARGE PAGE pfn 540  


    Below is the Virtual Address in binary.

    1: kd> .formats 8054099e

      Binary:  10000000 01010100 00001001 10011110


    I have split this VA into it's three parts.

    10                     Page Directory Pointer Table Offset

    000000 010      Page Directory Table Offset

    10100 00001001 10011110     This is the Offset into the large page


    Let’s get the base of the Page Directory Pointer Table and indentify which of the four entries we will need to follow.

    1: kd> !dq (@cr3 & 0xffffffe0) + ( 0y10 * 8) L1

    # 23406f0 00000000`06c46801


    Now take our address from above, add our zeros and we have the base of Page Directory Table. Then add the offset from our Virtual Address and we'll dump out the PDE.

    1: kd> !dq (6c46801 & 0xFFFFFF000) + ( 0y000000010 * 8) L1

    # 6c46010 00000000`004009e3


    Let’s convert the PDE to binary format to analyze the lower 12 bits. This will allow us to analyze the flags. The last Twelve bits (0-11) are used for the PFN. They are used for the flags that we discussed earlier.

    1: kd> .formats (00000000`004009e3 & 0x0000000FFF)

      Binary:  00000000 00000000 00001001 11100011


    Let’s analyze the flags from this VA using the information we learned earlier....

    ·         Bit Zero is set indicating that the page is Valid, located in physical memory, and all other bits

    ·         Bit One is set indicating that this page is Writeable (Hardware Field)

    ·         Bit Two is cleared indicating that this is a Kernel Mode Page

    ·         Bit Three is cleared indicating a Write-Back Caching policy (caching of writes to the page is enabled)

    ·         Bit Four is cleared indicating that caching is not disabled for the page.

    ·         Bit Five is set indicating this page has been Accessed

    ·         Bit Six is set indicating that this page is Dirty

    ·         Bit Seven is set indicating that this is a Large Page. This PDE points directly to a page, not a Page Table.

    ·         Bit Eight is set indicating other process share this Global PDE. No Delete upon TLB Cache Flush for process context switches.

    ·         Bit Nine is cleared indicating this page is not Copy-On-Write

    ·         Bit Ten is cleared indicating this is NOT a Prototype PTE

    ·         Bit Eleven is set also indicating this page is Writeable (Reserved Field, See Windows Internals, Chap. 9.)

    ...and compare our findings to the Flags output from !PTE, -GLDA—KWEV. My system doesn’t support No-Execute, so the E is also displayed.  For more information, .hh !PTE in windbg.

    We know this is a Large Page and is Valid, so we can obtain the directory of our 2-MB Large Page (on this PAE system) from this PDE. The Intel Manual states that in our PDE the last 21 bits aren’t part of the address base.

    1: kd> .formats (004009e3 & 0y11111111111000000000000000000000)

      Binary:  00000000 01000000 00000000 00000000



    So let’s combine the data from the PDE (Highlighted)  with the offset from the VA (Virtual Address).

    00000000 010  10100 00001001 10011110  

    Now I'll remove the spaces, precede this binary value with 0y, and send it to .formats.

    1: kd> .formats 0y00000000010101000000100110011110

      Hex:     0054099e

    We could have obtained the same data in this manner

    1: kd> ? (004009e3 & 0y11111111111000000000000000000000) + (8054099e & 0y00000000000111111111111111111111)

    Evaluate expression: 5507486 = 0054099e

    Now let’s dump the data in memory at this physical address

    1: kd> !db 0054099e

    #  54099e 33 db 8b 75 18 8b 7d 1c-0f 23 fb 0f 23 c6 8b 5d 3..u..}..#..#..]

    #  5409ae 20 0f 23 cf 0f 23 d3 8b-75 24 8b 7d 28 8b 5d 2c  .#..#..u$.}(.],

    #  5409be 0f 23 de 0f 23 f7 0f 23-fb e9 43 ff ff ff 8b 44 .#..#..#..C....D

    Now let’s dump the same data using the virtual address

    1: kd> db 8054099e

    8054099e  33 db 8b 75 18 8b 7d 1c-0f 23 fb 0f 23 c6 8b 5d  3..u..}..#..#..]

    805409ae  20 0f 23 cf 0f 23 d3 8b-75 24 8b 7d 28 8b 5d 2c   .#..#..u$.}(.],

    805409be  0f 23 de 0f 23 f7 0f 23-fb e9 43 ff ff ff 8b 44  .#..#..#..C....D

    So now you can see how I used the debugger to translate virtual addresses to physical adrresess. This concludes part two of this blog and in part three we will cover translation of x86 Non-PAE Virtual Address Translation, x64 Address Translation, and the TLB.

  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Archive of the Debug Ninja’s Twitter debug tips


    Every Wednesday I post a debug tip to our twitter page at www.twitter.com/ntdebugging. This blog is an archive of these tips to allow our readers to find this information easily. We will update this blog every few weeks with the new tips; follow us on twitter if you want to see the tips as I post them.

    The goal of these tips is to share debug commands, and forms of commands (parameters, flags, etc) that my colleagues and I find useful. I hope you can add these commands to your toolkit and they will help you debug more efficiently.


    !thread/!process [address] e - on x64 will not show you the meaningless Args to Child information.

    .frame /c [FrameNumber] - sets context to specified stack frame. Provides more reliable information than .trap on x64.

    kn - Dumps call stack with frame numbers, easier than counting stacks for .frame.

    .frame /r [FrameNumber] - same as .frame /c, but shows registers without changing context.

    Note: With .frame /c or /r you can only trust the nonvolatile registers. See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/9z1stfyw(VS.80).aspx for vol/nonvol regs.

    k=rbp rip FrameCount - Dumps call stack starting at rbp/rip on x64. Useful when the stack is corrupt. #debug ^DN

    .process/.thread /p /r [address] - sets new process context, sets .cache forcedecodeuser, and reloads user symbols. #debug ^DebugNinja

    !process [address] 17 - Sets the context for this command, avoids the need for .process to see user stacks. Try !process 0 17 #debug ^DN

    ~~[ThreadID]s - Changes threads in user mode. Use Thread ID number from output such as !locks. Ex: ~~[1bd4]s #debug ^DN

    runas /netonly /u:<account> windbg.exe - Launch windbg with domain account. Use when dbg computer isn't in domain and symbol server is. ^DN

    !heap -p -a <address> - Shows information about the heap block containing <address>, even if you aren't using pageheap. #debug ^DN

    ub - Unassembles starting at a location prior to your address. Accepts l<number> to specify how many instructions to go back. ub . l20 ^DN

    !stacks 2 [FilterString] - Finds kernel mode call stacks that contain the FilterString in a symbol. #debug ^DN

    !thread [address] 17 (or 1e on x64) - Sets context for this command, avoids the need for .thread/.process for user stacks. #debug ^DN

    .hh [Text] - Opens the debugger help. [Text] is the topic to lookup in the index. Example: .hh !pte   #debug ^DN

    ?? can dump structs using C++ style expressions. Ex: ??((nt!_KTHREAD*)(0xfffffa800ea43bb0))->ApcState #debug ^DN

    bp /t EThread - Sets a kernel mode breakpoint that only triggers when hit in the context of this thread. #debug ^DN

    bp /p EProcess - Sets a kernel mode breakpoint that only triggers when hit in the context of this process. #debug ^DN

    gc - If you run 'p' and hit a breakpoint, gc takes you where p would have gone if you had not hit the bp.  #debug ^DN

    gu - Go until the current function returns.  Effectively this unwinds one stack frame.  #debug #windbg ^DN

    pc - Steps through until the next 'call' instruction. Combine with other commands to find who returned your error> pc;p;r eax #debug ^DN

    pt - Steps through until the next 'ret' instruction. Similar to gu, but pt stops on the ret and gu stops after the ret. #debug ^DN

    .ignore_missing_pages 1 - supresses the error: "Page 2a49 not present in the dump file. Type ".hh dbgerr004" for details" #debug ^DN

    .exr -1 shows the most recent exception.  Useful in user dumps of crashes, especially for no execute crashes (NX/DEP). #debug ^DN

    wt - Trace calls until they return to the current address. More useful with -or to get return values. Use -l for depth. ^DN #debug

    .thread /w - Changes to the WOW64 32-bit context from 64-bit kernel mode. Wow64exts doesn't work in kernel mode. #debug ^DN

    ??sizeof(structure) - Gets the size of a structure, it's easier than counting. #debug ^DN

    sxe ld:module.dll - Enables an exception which will break into the debugger when module.dll is loaded. #debug ^DN

    vertarget - Shows OS version of the debug target. Also shows machine name, uptime, and session time (when the dump was taken). #debug ^DN

    !vm 1 - In a kernel debugger, shows basic information about memory usage. Available, committed, pagefile, pool, sysptes, etc. #debug ^DN

    .time - Shows session time (when dump was taken) and system uptime. In user mode shows process uptime, kernel/user time. #debug ^DN

    ba w size [address] - Break on write access only. Replace size with the num bytes you want to watch. Ex: ba w 4 005d5f10 #debug ^DN

    .bugcheck - Displays the bugcheck code of a blue screen crash. The format is more concise than !analyze.  #debug ^DN

  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Ntdebugging on Twitter


    We're now on Twitter @ http://twitter.com/ntdebugging. If you want to chime in with feedback or suggestions for future articles feel free to drop us a "tweet". I thought this was would give us a better venue to interact with you guys.


    Ron Stock

  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Debug Nugget: DumpConfigurator Utility


    Hi - my name is Naresh and I am a Sr. Escalation Engineer on the Microsoft GES platforms team. Today I'm discussing a simple, yet powerful GUI tool used to configure a Windows system locally or remotely for a memory dump. The name of the tool is DumpConfigurator.hta and it can be accessed from CodePlex.  Check out the following Microsoft KB article which references the use of the tool.

    969028  How to generate a kernel or a complete memory dump file in Windows Server 2008



    The tool can be used with all currently supported versions of the Windows Operating System. Once you download it, launch it with Administrator privileges to get the following UI: 


    The GUI is self-explanatory and all the settings can be edited and saved by clicking Save Settings. The system will have to be rebooted for the settings to take effect.
    NOTE: Read the Warranty Disclaimer for the tool before use:)


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    Working on an Application Compatibility Issue? Let us Help!


    This isn’t our typical debugging type article however I found the information very useful for the developer community.

    Windows 7 is slated to launch in the next few weeks. If your applications aren’t quite ready for Windows 7 and having you’re having issues we may be able to help you out!

    Last Monday we launched a new pilot program in our Advisory Services space.  Advisory Services is a consultative support option that provides support beyond standard break-fix issues.  The new program involves remote, phone-based support for issues such as product migration, code review or new program development.  The service is intended for Developers and IT Professionals for shorter engagements that don’t require traditional onsite consulting or sustained account management services available via other Microsoft support options.

    For the Application Compatibility engagements, we’ll start off with some basic scoping questions such as whether the application is 16-, 32-, or 64-bit.  Is it a client-server application?  What compatibility issues are you experiencing?  Slow Performance?  Hang or Crash?  Installation problems?  The support engineers will be using tools such as the Application Compatibility Toolkit, the the Standard User Analyzer Wizard, and the Setup Analysis Tool.

    The KB Article referenced below has more details about the program and how to engage Microsoft.  So, if you’re working on a pesky Windows Vista or Windows 7 Application Compatibility issue, give us a call – we can help!


    Additional Resources:




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  • Ntdebugging Blog

    Push Locks – What are they?


    Pushlocks were a new locking primitive first introduced in Windows Server 2003 and are primarily used in place of spinlocks to protect key kernel data structures. Unfortunately, Pushlocks are not documented in the WDK, and are not available for public use; however, a few internal drivers do use them, so you might see them while debugging a machine. Also, I was digging around on MSDN for Pushlocks, and I found that the Filter Manager does expose certain APIs to use Pushlocks, so you are in luck if you are developing a filter driver!


    Gate objects


    Pushlocks are built on primitive gate objects, which are defined by KGATE structures. The gate object is a highly optimized version of the basic event object. By not having both the notification and synchronization versions of the basic event object, and by being the exclusive object that a thread can wait on, the code for acquiring and releasing a gate is heavily optimized. Gates even have their own dispatcher lock instead of acquiring the entire dispatcher database.


    Unlike spinlocks, which must be acquired exclusively for all operations on a data structure, pushlocks can be shared by multiple “readers” and need only be acquired exclusively when a thread needs to modify the data structure.




    When a thread acquires a normal pushlock, the pushlock code marks the pushlock as owned, if it is not owned already. If someone owns the pushlock exclusively, or the thread wants to own the pushlock exclusively while someone else has it in shared mode, the thread allocates a wait block on its stack, initializes a gate object in the wait block, and then add the wait block to the wait list associated with the pushlock. When the thread holding the pushlock finally releases it, it wakes the next waiter by signaling the event in the waiters wait block.


    When debugging a machine, there is no easy way to figure out the current owner of the pushlock, apart from doing code review. By looking at the waitlist, you can always figure out the threads trying to get access to it, but since the gate does not keep track of the owner like a regular mutex, it is much harder to find the current owner.

    For more details on the operation and structure of a pushlock, please review the Pushlocks section in Windows Internals book, under the System Mechanisms Chapter.


    Advantages of using a PushLock


    If a pushlock is held by one or more readers, threads that want to modify the data structure are queued for exclusive access. This queuing mechanism provides some of the same benefits of queued spinlocks—for example, FIFO ordering, elimination of race conditions, and reduced cache thrashing when more than one thread is waiting for the pushlock.


    Another advantage of using a pushlock is the size. A regular resource object is 56 bytes, however a pushlock is the size of a pointer. Apart from a small memory footprint, this helps especially in the non-contended case, since pushlocks do not require lengthy operations to perform acquisition or release. Because the pushlock fits in one “machine word”, the CPU can use atomic operations to compare and exchange the old lock with the new one.


    Pushlocks are also self-optimizing in the sense that the list of threads waiting on a pushlock will be periodically rearranged to provide fairer behavior when the pushlock is released.


    Cache Aware Pushlocks


    A cache-aware pushlock adds to the basic pushlock by allocating a normal pushlock for each processor in the system and associating it with the cache-aware pushlock. When a thread wants to acquire a cache-aware pushlock for shared access, it simply acquires the pushlock on that processor; however if it needs to acquire the lock for exclusive access, it has to acquire the pushlocks for each processor in exclusive mode.


    What does a Pushlock look like?


    3: kd> !thread 8c9764c0

    THREAD 8c9764c0  Cid 2410.1be4  Teb: 7ff9f000 Win32Thread: e5c6f298 GATEWAIT

    Stack Init b386b000 Current b386a978 Base b386b000 Limit b3867000 Call 0

    ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child             

    b386a990 80833485 8c9764c0 8c9764e4 00000003 nt!KiSwapContext+0x26 (FPO: [Uses EBP] [0,0,4])

    b386a9bc 8082ffe0 b06a6a03 e11e0b18 b386aa54 nt!KiSwapThread+0x2e5 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: fastcall)

    b386a9e4 8087d722 00000000 e11e0b08 e11e0b18 nt!KeWaitForGate+0x152 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: fastcall)

    e11e0b18 00000000 0c050204 7346744e e37b2808 nt!ExfAcquirePushLockExclusive+0x112 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: fastcall)


    Above is a snipped output from a dump that I was recently looking at. From the stack, you can see the ExfAcquirePushLockExclusive call trying to acquire the pushlock, which then calls KEWaitForGate. In this case, the lock was already acquired, so this thread allocated a wait block on its stack, and then added itself to the waitlist.

    Also, the stack is broken due to the fastcall, therefore the debugger cannot display it entirely. So we can manually reconstruct the stack by passing parameters to the kb command.

    k[b|p|P|v] = BasePtr StackPtr InstructionPtr


    To get the arguments, we first dump the stack manually using the dps command with the current esp.

    3: kd> dps b386a978 l50

    b386a978  b386ad40

    b386a97c  00000000

    b386a980  8088dafe nt!KiSwapContext+0x26

    b386a984  b386a9bc

    b386a988  b386aa00

    b386a98c  f773f120

    b386a990  8c9764c0

    b386a994  80833485 nt!KiSwapThread+0x2e5

    b386a998  8c9764c0

    b386a99c  8c9764e4

    b386a9a0  00000003

    b386a9a4  8c9764c0

    b386a9a8  00000003

    b386a9ac  00000002

    b386a9b0  00000002

    b386a9b4  f773fa7c

    b386a9b8  008c0030

    b386a9bc  b386a9e4

    b386a9c0  8082ffe0 nt!KeWaitForGate+0x152

    b386a9c4  b06a6a03

    b386a9c8  e11e0b18

    b386a9cc  b386aa54

    b386a9d0  00000000

    b386a9d4  8c976504

    b386a9d8  00000000

    b386a9dc  0000001c

    b386a9e0  00000000

    b386a9e4  b386aa40

    b386a9e8  8087d722 nt!ExfAcquirePushLockExclusive+0x112

    b386a9ec  00000000

    b386a9f0  e11e0b08

    b386a9f4  e11e0b18

    b386a9f8  b386aa40

    b386a9fc  8096e9a9 nt!SeOpenObjectAuditAlarm+0x1cf

    b386aa00  00040007

    b386aa04  00000000

    b386aa08  8c976568

    b386aa0c  8c976568

    b386aa10  b06a6a00

    b386aa14  b4ee0a00

    b386aa18  b127cc10

    b386aa1c  00000000

    b386aa20  00000001

    b386aa24  80a60456 hal!KfLowerIrql+0x62

    b386aa28  b386ac04

    b386aa2c  8d117800

    b386aa30  00000000

    b386aa34  00000000

    b386aa38  b386aa20

    b386aa3c  01943080

    b386aa40  b386aa64

    b386aa44  808b7a14 nt!CmpCheckRecursionAndRecordThreadInfo+0x2a


    From the output above, we can see the stack. To reconstruct the stack, we can get the ebp, esp, and eip from the stack for the ExfAcquirePushLockExclusive frame, and pass it to the kb command. Voila!


    3: kd> kb = b386aa40 b386a9e4 8087d722

    ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child             

    b386aa40 808b7a14 b386ac04 e11e0b18 e11e0b18 nt!ExfAcquirePushLockExclusive+0x112

    b386aa64 808b7b09 e11e0b18 b386aa80 e101bf40 nt!CmpCheckRecursionAndRecordThreadInfo+0x2a

    b386aaa4 808da118 0000001c b386ab58 00000001 nt!CmpCallCallBacks+0x6b

    b386ab90 80937942 e101bf40 00000000 89f13648 nt!CmpParseKey+0xd4

    b386ac10 80933a76 00000000 b386ac50 00000040 nt!ObpLookupObjectName+0x5b0

    b386ac64 808bb471 00000000 8e930480 00000d01 nt!ObOpenObjectByName+0xea

    b386ad50 808897bc 0243eba0 00020019 0243eb68 nt!NtOpenKey+0x1ad

    b386ad50 7c8285ec 0243eba0 00020019 0243eb68 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0xfc

    WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.

    0243eba4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x7c8285ec



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    Part 2 - Exploring and Decoding ETW Providers using Event Log Channels


    Introduction and Overview

    In this article we will explore a practical use for ETW tracing, and discover what ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) tracing is available for a popular Windows user-mode component, Internet Explorer. In my previous article ETW Introduction and Overview, we covered what ETW tracing is and how it could be used.

    The goal in this exercise is to learn about ETW tracing in general, how to self-discover what tracing is available in a component, and some ways you can leverage the tracing to self-troubleshoot issues. ETW logging is essentially allowing Microsoft code to speak for itself. It tells you what code ran, what that code did, and any errors produced. Also ETW logs can be used along with a more traditional toolset for troubleshooting that class of issue such as the SysInternals tools, Network Monitor, etc.

    For this article, we are using the RC Build of Windows 7. The concepts and examples should be very similar and work fine for Windows Vista.

    Getting Started “Exploring”

    First we start off by opening Internet Explorer 8 whose home page is set to the NTDebugging Blog - http://blogs.msdn.com/ntdebugging


    In order to find what Internet Explorer is logging with ETW, we list all of the registered ETW providers on a box, which includes all of the installed code on the machine (the component doesn’t need to be actively running).

    We start off by running “logman query providers” and look through the list for relevant hits. However, the results below return more than 400+ hits on Vista, and 600+ on Win7. You will probably quickly see though that searching through this large list of providers might not always be best way to go about finding which providers Internet Explorer is logging with.


    Using this list we can also filter or browse for our component. This may work just fine, however, one issue with this approach is that sometimes you may not know the particular naming convention for a process. Also, many software components use shared dlll’s to do a variety of the under the hood work. As such, you may not know what each of those pieces of software are, or how they are named.

    Here we try running a built-in cmd line tool logman ‘query providers’ and searching for “Internet”, which didn’t turn up anything on this particular search. It looks like the naming convention for Internet Explorer might be a bit different than our first search.


    While we could continue to browse the large list of providers, I have decided to use another useful method to find which providers IE uses, which is to filter all providers that a certain ProcessId uses. We start out by getting the ProcessId of Internet Explorer using two methods shown here, Task Manager and the command line tasklist filtering on iexplore.exe.



    Now that we know Internet Explorer is running with process id 6200, we can do another query with logman to find out the ETW providers.

    Internet Explorer ETW Providers

    ‘Logman query providers –pid 6200’ is used to list all of the user-mode ETW providers that Internet Explorer uses and the associated GUIDs (GUIDs are the Globally Unique ids that enable tracing for a component).

    In looking at the screenshot below, notice that a wide variety of providers are shown, and at first glance, you may wonder how some relate to Internet Explorer. As you investigate further though, all these components enable certain features within Internet Explorer, but even with tracing enabled, may not log anything unless you specifically use the part of Internet Explorer which runs that code at run-time.

    It is also important to note that Internet Explorer will also use a lot of kernel services to eventually do its work, such as NDIS. There is ETW tracing for these kernel components, but would not show up under a specific process as they are used by all processes at the kernel level. Here we see a specific component of interest that we want to follow – Microsoft-Windows-WinINet. A quick Bing search of WinINet turns up this on MSDN, which sounds relevant.

    Extracted from MSDN: The Microsoft Windows Internet (WinINet) application programming interface (API) enables applications to access standard Internet protocols, such as FTP and HTTP. For ease of use, WinINet abstracts these protocols into a high-level interface.

    So Microsoft-Windows-WinINet looks like a good component to enable tracing in.


    From using SysInternals Process Explorer you can also confirm and that WININET.dll is loaded into the address space of iexplore.exe as shown below.


    Now that we know the ETW Provider name and GUID, we will launch Computer Mgmt and turn on tracing for that component. Note that not every Provider can be decoded this way (due to architectural and security reasons), but many can, and at the very least, the log can be enabled and provided to Microsoft Support to fully decode.

    Launch Computer Management by typing ‘compmgmt.msc’ into the start search box or right clicking Manage on Computer Management.


    Enabling ETW Logging

    Once in Computer Management, Navigate to and click on Event Viewer -> Applications and Services Logs. Once there, make sure View -> Show Analytic and Debug Logs is enabled as shown below, which will provide a much greater set of logs to look at. Most logs are under Event Viewer -> Applications and Services Logs -> Microsoft -> Windows, where we will spend the majority of our time. There are generally four channels that can show up under each provider. Channels are targeted at different roles. Admin and Operational channels target IT professionals and Administrators and are enabled by default, while Analytic and Debug Channels are more in depth, and not usually enabled by default.

    The logs that show up here are XML Manifest based tracing called Windows Events. ETW tracing splits up the collection and decoding of traces into two separate steps for performance and security reasons. In the manifest based tracing first available with Vista, most components and events are defined in a XML manifest compiled along with the binary, and which are defined in a resource file language dll. Most user-mode resource dlls show up under C:\Windows\System32\en-US (for English US). The good part about manifest based tracing is that many logs are self-discoverable and customer decodable!


    Next we will browse to: Event Viewer -> Applications and Services Logs -> Microsoft -> Windows -> WinINet, right click on the Analytic channel, and choose ‘Enable Log’. Remember that we had to enable this log because Analytic and Debug logs are not enabled by default. Enabling the channel will automatically enable the ETW tracing for that component and logs will start being decoded similar to the Event Log.


    Capture and view WinINet logging for our scenario

    After enabling the log, I am going to close Internet Explorer which is running code that is now logging using ETW and navigate to the website http://blogs.msdn.com/ntdebugging.


    Now we can look at the result of our work and tracing, which decodes the tracing for us. Below, we are on the WININET_REQUEST_HEADER category, showing the GET request. Note that the tracing here is showing us proxy interaction, DNS requests and responses, cookies, TCP requests/responses, as well as HTTP requests and responses.

    Now, one might be able to get the same information using a network capturing program such as NetMon or WireShark, but the nice thing about the ETW tracing here is that is

    a) In box without having to install additional tools

    b) The aggregate view of what the WinINet component is seen from its point of view (composed of DNS, TCP, Proxy, Cookies, etc).

    This is a good example of using this tracing in combination with other troubleshooting tools (if required), which may or may not be useful depending on the scenario.


    Dumping the trace log out using other methods:

    You can use the Event Viewer GUI, or if you prefer to view the log in a text editor (or spreadsheet). You can dump the log to text or CSV format using a couple of different methods.

    The first method is using the Windows Event Log GUI to export or save the event log


    Or you can output the entire log to screen in human readable text format:


    We can also output to the screen filtering for any messages with error level using an XPath Query. We can start right away if you know the XPath Syntax for your query, or you can use the GUI to help build the query for you. Once you choose ‘Filter Current Log’ you can filter by Event Level, or a variety of other criteria.


    The XML view will show you the raw XPATH syntax needed to use wevtutil to query for only Error events.


    Now we actually run the XPath query using ‘wevtutil query-events Microsoft-Windows-WinINet/Analytic /f:Text "/q:*[System[(Level=2)]]"’


    If you prefer a more complex format containing processors, threads, etc, then you can output to a csv log file. This is useful for sorting, filtering, comparing, and doing more complex analysis on the log file entries.


    Here we use ‘tracerpt c:\windows\system32\winevet\logs\Microsoft-Windows-WinINet%4Analytic.etl –of CSV –o c:\temp\Microsoft-Windows-WinINet%4Analytic.csv’ to output to a CSV.


    Finally, you can use PowerShell v2 to dump out the log. The PowerShell scenario is interesting, because you can write powerful scripts around the event logs.


    Look at ‘get-help get-winevent –examples” for many more really cool examples about how to list and filter these logs:


    Behind the Scenes

    We also need to explore behind the scenes of what is happening when you enable the analytic channel of the WinInet provider. Part of the definition of that channel is to enable an ETW Trace Session with certain pre-defined Keywords (Flags) and Levels. Keywords usually specify functional sub-components (HTTP, COOKIES, CONNECTION, etc) while Levels control the level of detail (Error, Informational, Verbose) events are logged. This is useful to fine-tune logging, but the channels make it easy not to have to mess with these unless required.

    Under Performance -> Data Collector Sets -> Event Trace Sessions we see a new session created for us and auto-named “EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Analytic”. This ETW logger was automatically created for us when we enabled the WinInet Analytic channel. You can also manually create the logger, which we may cover in another blog post. If you open up the properties for this session, you'll notice our provider listed as well as all the Keywords (Any) and Level specified. The screenshot also show which Keywords/Flags or categories a provider supports.


    Once you know a provider name, you can also query for it on the command line, which is useful to get all the Keywords(Flags) and Levels a provider supports, along with the processes that are using that provider.


    For the curious, we wanted to finish this post and show you how to find what tracing is available, and its format. Here we again use the wevtutil to get full publishing event and message information.

    ‘wevtutil get-publisher Microsoft-Windows-WinInet /getevents /getmessage’


    This can be combined with another version of the same utility searching for a certain string or log – e.g. “wevtutil gp Microsoft-Windows-WinINet /ge /gm | findstr /i httpopen”


    To wrap-up, here is the overall architecture of ETW covered in a previous blog post, along with the specifics of the scenario we covered. In our scenario the MMC Event Viewer console has two roles – enabling the tracing and decoding the real-time delivery of events.


    Where to go from here?

    This was meant as a practical introduction to using and self-discovering how to use the ETW tracing that is available right now in newer Windows releases (Vista/2008 and above). There are many, many more components that use tracing – 400+ in Vista and 600+ in Win7, which you can start exploring.

    For these specific examples, it is worth noting that as far as the networking aspect is concerned, similar information might be obtained from using a packet capture utility such as NetMon. What is interesting about NetMon in Win7 is that it actually uses ETW under the hood to do most of its tracing. Here is an interesting post about Network Tracing in Windows 7 from the Netmon team.

    The use of ETW under the hood of many tools is a general trend in Windows and Microsoft software. You might notice different diagnostics and tracing tools in Windows using ETW under the hood. These tools can add value to the raw ETW tracing such as further parsing, filtering, and rich views into the data. You can mix and match these tools along with the tracing for powerful views into your Windows box or server.

    It’s also important to note that ETW tracing isn’t just for Microsoft software. Since any software running on Windows uses many services provided by the OS, there is a variety of ETW logging that is available for all software. For example, try running ‘logman query providers –pid PROCESSID_OF_FIREFOX’ on FireFox! You should find a great deal of logging similar to Internet Explorer.

    In future posts, we hope to explore other ways of using ETW tracing, and touch on some of the kernel level tracing available.



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    WMI Nugget: How to Gather the Provider Binary from a WMI Class Name


    It's Venkatesh with a WMI nugget. While troubleshooting or debugging WMI issues you may come across WMI queries wherein you don’t know which provider implemented the WMI class used in the query. You may want to know the binary and the product that implemented the provider so you can contact the vendor or upgrade the binary to see if it resolves the issue you are investigating.

    To help make the investigation easier, Windows Vista and all post operating systems have the cool new 'Analytic and Debug log' for WMI tracing. To get similar tracing in Windows 2003 and earlier versions, WMI has a “Verbose Logging” option enabled through the WMI control (WmiMgmt.msc). Check out this blog for detailed steps to enable the WMI Analytic and Debug -


    After enabling WMI logging you will see events like the ones pictured below. There may be a particular WMI query relevant to the issue you're troubleshooting requiring you to know the provider binary for the WMI class in the query. Apart from the class name (InstProvSamp) in the query you need the WMI namespace to which this class belongs to such as '\\.\root\default' as shown below.


    Fig 1: Event ID 1 in the Windows Vista’s Event Viewer\Windows Logs\Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\WMI-Activity\Trace log

    Now we have the WMI Namespace and the class name so let’s find the provider for it.

    1. Get the provider name from the Class Name and Namespace:

    Every WMI class has a qualifier “provider” containing the name of the provider to which it belongs. Using wbemtest.exe connect to the namespace we mentioned above(\\.\root\default). Then get the class information for our class, InstProvSamp using the “Open Class…” button. After clicking "OK" the Object editor for InstrProvSamp displays the class information for InstProvSamp including the name of the provider it belongs to (CIM_STRING qualifier “provider” as shown below).



    2. Get the class identifier (CLSID) of the provider from the provider name:

    For every WMI provider WMI maintains an instance of system class __Win32Provider which contains information about the physical implementation of the provider like CLSID which contains the GUID that represents the class identifier (CLSID) of the provider COM object. Now query the repository to get the provider information for “InstProvSamp” provider as I did below.




    3. Get the provider binary from the provider’s CLSID:

    During registration every COM object adds an entry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID. Using regedit.exe you can browse to provider’s COM registration information using the CLSID obtained from Step 2 as shown below.


    This should help you connect the dots while debugging your WMI issue. Let me know if you have additional questions!

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