Holy cow, I wrote a book!
Even if you figure out which DLL the return address belongs to
that doesn't mean that that is actually the DLL that called you.
A common trick is to search through a "trusted" DLL for some code
bytes that coincidentally match ones you (the attacker) want to execute.
This can be something as simple as a "retd" instruction, which
are quite abundant. The attacker then builds a stack frame that
looks like this, for, say, a function that takes two parameters.
hacked parameter 1
hacked parameter 2
After building this stack frame, the attacker then jumps to
the start of the function being attacked.
The function being attacked looks
at the return address and sees trusted_retd,
which resides in a trusted DLL. It then foolishly trusts the
caller and allows some unsafe operation to occur, using
hacked parameters 1 and 2. The function being attacked then
does a "retd 8" to return and clean the parameters.
This transfers control to the trusted_retd,
which performs a simple retd, which now gives
control to the hacker_code_addr, and the hacker
can use the result to continue his nefarious work.
This is why you should be concerned if somebody says,
"This code verifies that its caller is trusted..."
How do they know who the caller really is?